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COMPLICT AND INEQUALITY IN SURFACE IRRIGATION:
A SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Prem S. Vashishtha1 and Dalbir Singh1
Abstract
This paper attempts to understand the role of institutions and governance, in explaining unequal access to
canal water under different rules of the game. Two states at different levels of agricultural productivity with different
rules of distribution of canal water are chosen to study the problem at project level. While Bihar, at low level of
agricultural productivity, represents absence of scientific method of distribution of water, Punjab offers high level of
agricultural productivity with the warabandi system. The two case studies offer interesting similarities and
dissimilarities in terms of unequal access to water by the tail enders and mechanisms needed to mitigate this inequality.
Some similarities are: (a) the tail enders suffer the most with low access to water forcing them to adopt only low water
intensive crops in comparison to the head reach and mid reach farmers; and (b) the farmers supplement canal water
with ground water. The dissimilarities noticed are: (a) while over exploitation of ground water in Punjab has reached
levels beyond natural recharge of aquifers in several places; in Bihar, with low withdrawal of ground water and
natural endowment of high water table, such a situation has not arisen; (b) the breaking of canal and water courses
for own benefit by the powerful with political clout is rampant in Bihar, rarely attracting a penalty from the irrigation
department; (c) the water market for tubewell water (Rs.70 to 80 per hour) has developed in Bihar partly mitigating
inequality in access to canal water by the tail enders; no such phenomenon is common in Punjab. The plausible
reason for the low density of tubewells in Bihar in contrast to Punjab is low incomes making affordability of tubewell
an issue, and (d) cooperative efforts by farmers to lay down pipes through neighbors’ plots to minimize loss of water
has succeeded in Punjab; in Bihar such efforts succeeded initially at a small scale but could not sustain without
government assistance. The absence of scientific rule for distribution of canal water and the weak canal governance
system aggravates the misery of tail enders. In such a scenario, the mitigation of unequal access to water by the tail
enders is facilitated by the development of water markets at high cost in a complex situation with tiny holdings and
lack of cooperation among the farmers.
1. INTRODUCTION
Expansion of surface irrigation in seventies and eighties was followed by a rising gap between the
potential created and the utilization of potential of irrigated area. The degree of utilization of irrigated potential
varies across schemes with different scales (large, medium and minor). One feature is common to states at
different levels of agricultural development, i.e., despite expansion of irrigation potential, the gross irrigated area
in most states declined in the nineties and continues to decline. The increasing inefficiency of the canal irrigation
system is also associated with highly unequal distribution of water between the head reach and the tail end
farmers (Shah, 2001). This inequity and inefficiency manifests in supply of excess water at the head reach
leading to waterlogging and salinity and high scarcity of water at the tail end (Vashishtha, 2007). In fact, the
scarcity at the tail end is very severe at some locations not just for a season or two but for several consecutive
years threatening the very livelihood of the tail end farmers.  In that situation, the tail-enders depend highly on
ground water, many of whom buy tube well water from their resourceful neighbors to save their crops (Meinzen-
Dick, 1996; Palmer-Jones, 1994). It is also observed in the literature that while the buy-sell phenomenon of
ground water is beneficial to both the buyer and the seller in financial terms in the short run, excessive depen-
dence on ground water resulting in lowering of water table could pose a major threat to all jeopardizing the
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ground water balance in the long run (Morris, 2007). The above scenario raises several questions that need
probing:
(i) What steps has the local community (mainly farmers in the command area) taken to mitigate unequal
distribution of canal water, especially when the state irrigation authorities have virtually failed to take
corrective measures?
(ii) Do farmers operating under different rules of distribution of water (in different regions) react differently
against unequal access to water by the tail enders? Are farmers prepared to invest/contribute to the
common pool to take corrective steps to improve local access to water?
(iii) Are tail-enders able to mitigate the suffering inflicted by lack of access to canal water through purchase
of tube well water from neighbors?
This study aims at examining the above questions with the help of evidence collected from the field and
is organized as below. Section 2 outlines the main objectives of this study and the methodology of conducting the
field study. Section 3 describes the main features of sample locations. The field observations are presented in
section 4. The last section 5 presents the concluding observations and policy implications.
2. OBJECTIVES AND THE METHODOLOGY
2.1 Objectives
 Keeping in view the issues discussed, the paper, in a socio-ecological perspective, focuses on the
following objectives:
1. To discuss the relative access of tail enders vs. head reach farmers to surface water in a canal command
area, the nature of conflicts arising thereof and the socio-ecological problems associated with it.
2. To explore the role of local community (group of farmers in the canal command area) and other institu-
tions in mitigating the impact of unequal access to surface water under diverse institutional arrangements
of distribution of canal water.
3. To discuss whether the emergence of water markets has helped mitigate inequity in access to canal water
and also the consequences associated with external diseconomies (declining water table), if any.
2.2  Methodology
Given the nature of research issues, it was decided to focus on 2 states for a comparative study, the
main criteria of selection of states being (i.) they represent different levels of agricultural development, and (ii)
they have different sets of rules for distribution of canal water at the village/water course level.  As regards the
choice of irrigation project, it was guided by prior knowledge about the nature of inequality and the conflict
involved in the distribution of canal water. Whether or not the farmers took initiative to mitigate the intensity of
conflict arising due to unequal access to canal water also featured in the choice of projects. Coming to the choice
of village, it was dictated by the location.  One village from each location (head, middle and tail end) was selected
for field visits for intensive observations and discussion with the village leaders (well-informed individuals) and
a group of farmers at each location. Although we did not conduct a farmer level survey, we did draw upon other
studies based on farmer level data. It may be pointed out that the main insight relating to the existing water
institutions and their functioning came from village level information and focused group discussions. Interaction
with different stakeholders helped understand the ground reality on conflict and its resolution by the community.
All this information was supplemented by secondary data of villages and districts selected for the study. This
exercise is expected to share regional experiences for improving water access to the deprived groups and also
form the basis for initiating an effective dialogue at different levels.
The 2 states viz. Bihar and Punjab were selected for a comparative study. These 2 states are at different
levels of per capita state domestic product and agricultural productivity. While Punjab is in the top level of
agricultural productivity, and high value of per capita state domestic product, Bihar is in the category of bottom
level of states in respect to both these parameters. The per capita income (at 1993-94 prices) of Punjab is about811
four times that of Bihar. As regards poverty ratio (percentage of population below poverty line), Bihar has 42.6%
for rural and 42% for the entire State in  comparison to Punjab’s poverty ratio of only 6.33% and 6.2% for rural
and entire state, respectively.  Even compared to the all India situation, Bihar fares poorly in terms of poverty
ratio (Table 1). The physical yield of major food grain crops gives a good idea of the relative agricultural
productivity levels in different states. Punjab’s yield of rice and wheat is more than 2 times that of Bihar. Even for
maize, the yield of Punjab is more than one-and-a- half times that of Bihar (Table 2).
Table 1: Income and Poverty Level in Bihar, Punjab and India
Bihar Punjab India
Per Capita income   (Rs.)
2003-04 3,776 18,364 11,799
2004-05 4,159 19,354 12,416
Poverty Ratio (2004-05)
- Rural 42.59 6.35 28.29
- Urban 32.42 5.75 25.62
- All 41.99 6.16 27.62
Poverty ratio refers to percentage of population below poverty line as taken from Planning
Commission, GoI, New Delhi.
Table 2: Productivity of Major Food grain Crops, 2003-04: Bihar, Punjab and India
                                           (kg/ha)
S. No. Crop Bihar Punjab India
1 Rice 1386 3694 1978
2. Wheat 1903 4200 2696
3. Course cereals 1816 2675 1107
4. Maize 1682 2982 1875
The 2 states have very different system of canal water distribution. Punjab’s warabandi system is
designed to have an equitable distribution of canal water, at least by design. Bihar does not have such a scientific
system at all. The turn of head-reach and tail end farmers for distribution of canal water is not scientifically
worked out by the state irrigation department. Discussion with Bihar government officers and local scholars
indicates that since initially there was no water shortage in Patna, the efforts to develop an equitable system did
not receive attention. After deterioration in the maintenance of the canal system, the issue of equitable distribu-
tion has assumed importance. In the absence of a warabandi system, the decision of the irrigation department to
discharge water in the distributaries is influenced by the pressure exerted by different interest groups (stakehold-
ers) for favoring their constituency.
3. SAMPLE SITES
Having chosen the 2 states for this study, the choice of site for intensive study involved the following
steps: one irrigation project-within each state; a canal or distributory within a project; village (and district) in
each project; and some stakeholders in each location of the distributory. Appropriate projects and sites were
selected in district Jalandhar of Punjab and district Patna of Bihar. The basic information on the sample sites is
contained in Table 3.812
        Table 3:   Irrigation Project and the Sample Sites
Reach/Location Village corresponding
at the distributory  to reach/location
North Punjab Bist Daob canal - Head Mullah Bediyan
(district: Jallandhar) - Middle Khanpur
- Tail Sarali
East Bihar Sone Canal - Head Dhanesar Pura
Maner distributory - Middle Datiana
(district: Patna) - Tail Korhar
3. 1  Punjab
Cropping Pattern: In Bist Doab canal command area, the farmers grow three crops in each season -
wheat, sugarcane and green fodder in kharif, and paddy, maize and vegetable (potatoes) in rabi. Some farmers
also allocate land in limited proportion to grow mint during zaid season. The cropping pattern in the mid reach
and tail end villages is quite similar to that observed is the head reach villages (Table 4). It is obvious that in both
the crop seasons, the present cropping pattern is water intensive. The irrigation water requirement is met from
canal as well as groundwater sources.
  Table 4: Cropping Pattern of Villages located at different reaches: Jalandhar (Punjab)
Crops at different reaches
Head Middle Tail end
1 Kharif Wheat, Sugarcane Wheat, green fodder Wheat, green fodder
& green fodder
2 Rabi Paddy, maize & Potato Paddy, maize Paddy, maize
3 Zaid Mint Not specified Not specified
Source: Group Discussion with village leaders / other stakeholders
3.1.1 Source of Irrigation
Groundwater is the major source of irrigation in all the selected villages. The area of head reach village
is spread on both the sides of the canal with undulating topography, rendering one side of the canal unfavorable
for gravity irrigation. The area under canal irrigation varies at different locations from one-fourth to one-half of
the irrigated area. The major proportion i.e. 50-75% water requirements is met from groundwater. In the mid
reach village, the irrigation water requirement is fulfilled by canal and groundwater sources in equal proportion.
Because of insufficient supply of canal water at the tail end, it meets only less than one-fifth of the total irrigation
requirement (Table 5).
Table 5: Source of irrigation at different locations: Jalandhar (Punjab)
S. No. Source Proportion (%)  of irrigated area
Head Middle Tail
1 Canal water 25-50* 50 15-20
2 Groundwater 50-75 50 80-85
Source: Field Observations
(* This case is rather unusual due to undulating topography of the head reach village)
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3.1.2 Groundwater Table
The discussion with the village elders and knowledgeable individuals shows that the depth of groundwa-
ter varies from location to location. According to the village leaders the water depletion has been faster in the last
five years than in the previous years. The decline in the water table at the tail end (25 to 30 feet) is far greater than
that observed at other reaches. Relatively higher decline in the water table at the head reach (10ft) than at the
middle reach (2 to 3ft) is an uncommon phenomenon arising due to the peculiar undulating topography of the
head reach village (Table 6).
Table 6. Depth of and Decline in Groundwater Table at Different Location. Jalandhar (Punjab)
Head Middle Tail
Depth of Water Table (ft) 200-220 200-230 250-270
Decline in water table is the last 5 years (ft) 10 2-3 25-30
3.2 Bihar
3.2.1 Cropping Pattern
At the head reach villages, farmers grow paddy in kharif, and wheat in rabi season. In the middle reach
paddy, maize and groundnut in kharif, and wheat and vegetables in the rabi season are grown.  At the tail end,
paddy, maize and green fodder in Kharif and wheat, gram and green fodder in rabi are the main crops (Table 7).
Due to the availability of sufficient water at the head reach the farmers allocate their land to water
intensive crops such as paddy in kharif and wheat in rabi season. The cultivation of less water intensive crops
like gram and mustard was absent. At the middle reach, the farmers allocate certain proportion to other crops
such as maize and groundnut in kharif and vegetables in the rabi season. At the head and middle reach, the
farmers also grow less water intensive crops (e.g; gram and green fodder). The proportion of agricultural land
allocated to different crops varies significantly even within a location.
Table 7: Cropping Pattern of Villages located at Different Reaches: Patna (Bihar)
Crop at different reaches
Head Middle Tail end
1 Kharif Paddy, green fodder Paddy, maize Paddy, maize,
and groundnut green fodder
2 Rabi Wheat, green fodder Wheat, vegetables Wheat, gram and
green fodder
3.2.2 Source of irrigation
A very clear pattern of relative use of surface and ground water across different reaches is noticeable.
The contribution of surface (canal) water declines drastically as one moves from the head reach village to the
middle reach, and finally to the tail end.  Canal water meets more than 90-95% of irrigation requirement at the
head reach, 40-50% requirement at the middle reach and none at the tail end (Table 8). The canal maintenance is
so poor and the tail enders are almost totally deprived of canal water. Obviously, the dependence on ground
water increases as one moves from head  to the middle and then to the tail end.  Since the availability of electricity
is extremely limited and voltage fluctuations are high, the farmers have to reply mainly on diesel pump sets for
lifting ground water. This is why tail end villages have quite a good number of diesel pump sets (approx 50). It
was noticed that the problem of water scarcity has increased in recent years and almost 8-10 tube wells have
been added at the tail end every year in the last three years.
Particulars
Location of selected villages
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Table 8: Main Source of Irrigation at Different Reaches / Location: Patna (Bihar)
S. No. Source Proportion (%) of Irrigated  area
Head Middle Tail end
1 Canal water 90 - 95 40 - 50 Zero
2 Ground water 5 - 10 50 - 60 100
Source: As in table 1.
3.2.3 Ground Water Table
It is observed that the groundwater table varies across different reaches (Table 9).  The fluctuation in
the level of groundwater across seasons is relatively low at the head reach village. Low availability of canal water
helped recharge groundwater at head reach and prevented decline in water table. In the villages located at mid
and tail reaches the aquifer depleted at a fast rate in the last five years; example, by 10 ft in the middle reach and
by 15 - 20 ft at the tail end.
Table 9. Depth of and Decline in Ground water Table at Different sites: Patna (Bihar)
                Particulars Location of selected villages
Head Middle Tail
Depth of water table (ft) 100-150 100-150 120-180
Decline in water table in the  last Nil 8-10 15-20
 5 years (ft)
4.   DISCUSSION ON FIELD OBSERVATIONS
4. 1 Punjab
The main observations made on the basis of field visits are:
4.1.1 Unequal Access to Canal Irrigation
The accessibility to canal water at different locations varies significantly. Although it may be attributed
partly to undulating topography, the major factor is the lack of accountability of irrigation department for main-
tenance of tributaries and water courses. Further, the rotational procedure of canal water distribution that is
supposed to be revised every year2 has not been changed for the last one decade. It is surprising that the local
farming community has not taken up this issue with the irrigation department.
4.1.2 Concentration of Water Intensive Cropping Pattern
Water intensive crops like paddy and wheat are common in all locations in spite of canal water being
scarce at the tail end. The shortage of canal water is compensated through ground water lifting.
4.1.3 Emergence of Alternative Institutional Arrangement
The irrigation department has failed in its responsibility of maintaining and developing the irrigation
structures (Stephen, 2002). The void is being filled on a limited scale by an alternative institutional arrangement
in the form of users’ cooperation. Farmers took initiative to organize themselves to repair and construct water
courses leading to improvement in accessibility of water. Those who did not participate in this venture did not
benefit. This led to differences between the farmers’ group. The farmers sorted the issue by making the process
2 In certain areas, the rotation takes place on Diwali.815
more inclusive. Farmers have succeeded in laying down cemented pipe lines in the fields to help eliminate
potential disputes over water access. This collective effort was attempted at the minor irrigation level as well.
The neighboring villages have also made similar arrangements. It is noteworthy that this has been achieved
through farmers’ own resources without any direct support from the irrigation department.
4.1.4 Absence of Canal Water Theft
In the sample sites, the incidences relating to water theft (or siphoning of canal water) were non-
existent. It may be attributed to the spirit of vigilance among the farming community. This sends a strong signal
that breaking water course and/or siphoning off water will be reported to irrigation authorities inviting stringent
punishment.
4.1.5 Non-existence of Water Markets
In the selected villages, there is hardly any buying and selling of ground water. In a few cases if water
is sold, it is because of social considerations, not for financial gain.
4.1.6 Charges for Canal Water and Electricity Use
In Punjab, as per the announcement made by the then government, the canal water and elec-
tricity used in agriculture were available without any charges or at very little cost. This has resulted in several
adverse situations such as: (i) overdrawing of groundwater even beyond recharge capacity; (ii) revenue deficit
and lack of resources for improving transmission expanding capacity for electricity board because of zero or
small cost of electricity; and (iii) higher price of electricity for domestic use due to cross-subsidization (from Rs.
1/unit to Rs. 4/ unit in couple of years). The farming community has its own perceptions regarding such political
concessions (Dubash, 2007; Kumar, 2005). They feel that free power is of no use to them in the long run.  Since
power is not available for more than 8 hrs/day, they would be willing to pay for power used for extraction of
groundwater for improved quality and quantity.
4. 2 Bihar
The following main findings are based on field observations:
4.2.1 Unequal Access to Canal Water
It is obvious from Table 6 that the dependence on canal water for irrigation declines sharply from head
reach to middle reach and tail end.  The situation at the tail end is so bad that water has not reached there at all
for the last so many years. In contrast, the head reach farmers’ dependence on ground water is only 5-10% as
they get a major part of their water requirement from canal water. As a result, the head reach farmers are able to
devote a much higher proportion of their cultivated area to paddy and wheat.3
4.2.2 Extension of Command Area Causing More Scarcity ofWater
The village leaders mentioned that there was substantial water in Maner canal until 1964-65. Water from
Sone river was diverted to the newly constructed canal that caused reduction of water in the Maner canal
affecting the farmers adversely in its command area. Some of the farmers reported that they had taken up the
matter of restoring the share of water in this canal with the irrigation department. It did not give any results due
to lack of effective leadership and political support in favor of farmers in the command area of newly con-
3Figures on area under paddy and wheat are not given in Table 5 but this phenomenon was confirmed by the village leaders and
panchayat functionaries. However, as a part of food security and survival strategy farmers at the tail end do grow paddy and wheat
even though they obtain much less yield than obtained by the head reach farmers.816
structed canal.4 The expansion of canal network without commensurate increase in discharge of water has
aggravated the difficulty of farmers, especially tail enders.
4.2.3 Negligence of Maintenance, Blockage of Canal and Conflicts
The canal has not been cleaned properly since almost 25 years. Whenever cleaning was undertaken it
was done only in small segments which failed to maintain a free flow of water to farmers at different reaches.
Water courses are also poorly maintained (Gulati et al., 2004). In certain cases, canals had eroded completely
and resulted in unchecked water flow from one field to the other, leading to accumulation of excess water near
the outlet. Farmers reported that such unregulated water flow causes loss of fertilizer applied in the fields located
near outlet. Because of undulating land, the farmers with higher level of land tend to block distributory to raise
water level and attempt to siphon it off to meet their water requirement. Influential and powerful farmers, mainly
big land-lords with political clout are more likely to be involved in the blockage of canal irrigation than small and
marginal farmers (Saleth, 2004).5 This kind of activity on the part of some influential individuals in the area has
provided too much of water at the mid reach village resulting in over-irrigation at those sites (interestingly, head
reach farmers are not involved in it) and led to severe scarcity of canal water at the tail end villages.6
4.2.4 Emergence of Water Markets
During the summer, the shortage of water reaches up to one-third to one-half of the total requirement
even at the mid reach. As mentioned earlier, since the canal water does not reach at the tail end, the farmers
depend entirely on the ground water. The resourceful farmers have installed pump sets (mainly diesel) which
enables them to draw ground water not only for their own use but also for sale to others. Well owners charge
Rs.70 – 80/hr for water. It is observed that even poor farmers, including the marginal ones, manage to irrigate
their land by buying water from other farmers. This of course, is done at a high cost in the absence of availability
of canal water. The emergence of water market does help poor farmers to mitigate the extreme shortage of
water partly (Barah, 1993; Meinzen-Dick, 1996; Vashishtha, 2003).
4.2.5 Emergence of Informal Institutional Arrangement
Certain informal institutional arrangements evolved to help the system from complete collapse. A group
of farmers restored some water courses. This phenomenon is not prevalent in the entire village. This group was
informal and included different category of farmers – big as well as small. Most of them had contiguous piece of
land. However, it could not expand its base in the entire village. This group also approached the irrigation
department, government of Bihar, for financial help to repair and maintain the channel and water courses but
without success.
4.2.6 Encroachment on Canal  Area
The villagers of tail end reported that since 1977, there was no availability of water in the canal. Taking
advantage of this situation, some individuals encroached the land area. Surprisingly, a group used it even for
construction of shelters. Due to unlawful activities at the tail end the canal bed area has shrunk and is now
converted into a small drain.
4.3 Comparative Picture
No doubt, Punjab and Bihar case studies present a contrasting picture, they also have some broad
similarities in respect of inequality in access to canal water and canal administration.  Some of these aspects are
presented below:
4 Similar evidence was noticed in Haryana in Hansi-Bhutana link canal which was constructed in the recent past.  The farmers in the
adjacent canal command area protested and asked for restoring their original share of water prior to the construction of canal.
5 A similar phenomenon is observed in Haryana by Vashishtha (2003).
6 It was also reported that part of the scarcity is due to diversion of canal water for use in non-farm activities.817
4.3.1 Tail Enders are the Most Deprived Lot
In both Punjab and Bihar, access to canal water is very low as compared to the head reach and mid-
reach farmers. In Bihar, however, the tail enders are pushed to the extreme situation of almost complete depriva-
tion in terms of access to water. The unchecked siphoning off of water from canal by powerful elements
reflects the status of socio-political milieu in rural Bihar.
4.3.2 Neglect of Canal Maintenance and Watercourses
This aspect is common to both the states. In the case of Bihar, this neglect is pushed to a desperate level
due to the virtual financial bankruptcy of the irrigation department. Irrigation rates are very low in both states and
the state governments do not intend to offend the farmers by raising irrigation tariff. In Bihar, an additional factor
is the low agricultural productivity and high rural poverty, which discourages the state government to face risk
involved in raising tariffs. In Punjab, the level of productivity and poverty per se is not the major issue. However,
the stagnant productivity and declining profit levels in agriculture production may be an important deterrent for
the state government to raise tariff levels.
4.3.3 Socio-ecological Problems
Certain features common to both Bihar and Punjab may be noted: (i) availability of excess water and
raising of water intensive crops at the head-reach irrespective of the overall shortage of water; (ii) significant
decline in ground water table, especially at the tail end (decline in water table at the tail end is much sharper in
Punjab than in Bihar).  Since, the ground water table is already too low in Punjab and over-exploitation of
groundwater has gone beyond the recharge capacity of aquifer in many places (Singh, 2006), the environmental
consequences of decline in water table are more serious and imminent in Punjab than in Bihar; (iii) minor
encroachment in canal and distributory takes place in Punjab too but in the case of Patna, (Bihar) encroachment
in the form of settlement in the canal bed at the tail end is extreme; (iv) the political economy of very low power
tariff (or zero tariff) for lifting ground water is quite similar in both states.  However, the environmental negative
externalities of power tariff policy are more serious and imminent in Punjab as compared to Bihar due to (a) the
extent of over exploitation of ground water that has already taken place in Punjab; and (b) continuing incentives
favoring water intensive crops (e.g. paddy) and discouraging crop diversification (Singh, 2007).
4.3.4 Water Markets
There is little evidence of water markets in Punjab. In contrast, in Bihar there exists market for ground
water and the pump set owners charge Rs.70-80 per hour for supplying ground water to their neighbors. A
plausible reason for absence of ground water markets in Punjab may be the widespread ownership of tube wells
and pump sets by many farmers. This is facilitated by the reasonably high level of agricultural productivity (vis-
à-vis all India), relatively larger average land holdings and consolidation of land holdings (Shah, 1993). In con-
trast, in Bihar, the productivity level is too low, average landing is small, and holdings are fragmented rendering
installment of tube well and pump sets unaffordable by individual farmers. The ground water market in Bihar
helps partly mitigate inequality in access to canal water even for the marginal farmers (Singh et al. 2007).
4.3.5 Informal Institutional Arrangement
In Punjab, the farmers managed to evolve an informal cooperative mechanism and pool their resources
for repairing damaged water courses and laying down pipes through fields of different plot owners to minimize
waste of water and avoid potential conflict.  Siphoning off canal water is rare and there is respect for running the
warabandi system. This is not observed in Bihar. The farmers attempted, on a very limited scale, to organize
themselves and restored a few water courses. However, this experiment could not be extended to the entire
village. The tiny land holdings, low productivity, fragmented society on caste basis and the apathy of the state818
government machinery to the problems and difficulties of the people made the cooperative venture difficult to
sustain. Further, lack of respect for allowing free flow of water by the unscrupulous and powerful elements is
a big challenge to the poor and fragmented units to organize themselves into an effective and cohesive group.  It
is important to emphasize that a combination of factors (economic, social and institutional) poses a big problem
for restoring a credible governance system for canal administration.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Poor distribution of canal water to the middle and tail end users has lead to sever and unsustainable
withdrawal of ground water in Punjab and creation of water markets in Bihar. Addressing local institutions, the
size and distribution of land holdings and support from public authority are a pre-requisite to bringing about any
improvement in canal water distribution, preventing water losses and conserving ground water.
In case of Punjab, the environment is already conducive to surface water management since the size of
landholdings is large, farmers have sufficient revenue to undertake repair, the warabandi system or system of
taking turns for access to water already exists. If local institutions are more active and work with communities,
they can have equitable distribution of water to the tail end users as well. In case of Bihar, the small size of land
holdings and poor income of farmers act as major deterrents. Further, the institutions set up for management of
canal water are inefficient and partial. The first step towards addressing distribution in Bihar would thus be
reforming the institutions and making them more accountable.
Reasonably good level of agricultural productivity coupled with relatively large and consolidated land
holdings do provide incentive for return in investment of a joint venture for repair of water courses and laying
down of pipes to avoid wastage of water, the factors that are missing in Bihar.
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